LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
foreign operation they wish. Access to high-resolution space imagery was, until recently, limited to a small number of well-heeled states with the industrial and technical capacity to develop, launch, and operate satellites. This is no longer the case.
This paper examines the technological and policy trends of high resolution, commercial space imaging, extrapolates current capability into the near future (2010), defines the general threat posed by the capability, and concludes with proposals to mitigate the threat. The genie of near real time, high-resolution observation of the earth's surface is out of the bottle. It cannot be put back. The focus here will be on commercial, publicly accessible, and licensed space imaging systems and their application in ways that pose threats to the United States. Not discussed are systems such as low-resolution weather satellite systems, and applications such as land use planning, forestry, and hydrology. Also omitted are government controlled space imaging systems that do not release products to the public.
Growth in the capability of commercial space imaging (CSI) systems will pose new threats and challenges by the year 2010. Some forms of these are emerging today as CSI capabilities surpass 1-meter resolution and image availability reaches near real time. A growing number of nations are launching commercial imaging satellites and selling the imagery on the open market. By 2010, the ability of any group with the financial assets to discern objects one foot in size from space, and to detect a wide variety of other activity using radar and other imaging sensors, represents a significant military and political capability. Threats and challenges are not limited to the direct threat posed by observability of activities. They are more importantly manifest in information based challenges to government policy, diplomacy and decision-making.
The most threatening, least recognized, and most likely manifestation of this threat is as a component of information operations directed at national policy formulation and execution.
COMMERICAL SPACE IMAGING DESERT STORM/1992 Much has changed in the intervening years since Desert Storm. In 1992, commercially available capability was limited to a small number of space imaging systems, most of them operated by governments. Resolution of publicly accessible systems was typically in the 10-meter or greater range. 1 In 1992 only two commercial panchromatic (visible light), gray scale imaging systems were flying: France's SPOT 1 and 3. The United States and Japan were flying commercial infrared satellites in 1992 that operated with resolutions between 18 meters and 1.1 kilometers. The United States, Japan, and CIS also flew radar-imaging satellites with resolutions between 15 and 100 meters. 2
Ten-meter resolution does not provide sufficient image detail to be of use by news organizations and is of limited use to potential adversaries. Military uses of imagery in the 10-meter or greater range are limited to exploitation and identification of large facilities such as logistics facilities, ports, and assembly areas and to terrain and environmental applications.
Identification or counting of ground vehicles and aircraft is generally impossible at this resolution.
While not possible to build order of battle with this imagery, it was used as an air missionplanning tool by the United States. The combination of commercial imagery with DOD digital terrain data made it possible to produce mission rehearsal graphics for U.S. aircrews. This capability has been available on the open market for a number of years, but it offers little utility in support of terrorist or small-scale military operations. It is more applicable to geospatial and terrain analysis than it is to developing detailed target intelligence.
COMMERICAL SPACE IMAGING 2002
The CSI market has changed dramatically since 1992 with rapid growth in the number and capability of systems and the number or countries in the market. Identification of all the players in the market is a complex task unto itself, with published listings of operating companies varying from source to source. For example, a NASA listing of commercial systems does not list any systems flown by an international consortium dominated by Israel called ImageSat
International. 4 Yet, this group is significant in that it not only sells imagery, but it also leases exclusive satellite access, to include full tasking authority over the sensor. Customers can essentially rent an imaging satellite. From the company's web site:
The Satellite Operating Partner service provides a customer with exclusive tasking rights for confidential reception of images at his ground station (emphasis added) and the use of one or more dedicated ImageSat International satellites over a specific geographical area. ISI provides dedicated systems that are operated as an "end-to-end system" by SOP customers, from imaging mission planning, satellite tasking and satellite imagery collection and processing in realtime.
SOP customers are equipped, within six months, with all the hardware and software that is required to operate the satellite in real-time.
Satellite Operating Partner Ground Receiving Stations (SOPs) communicate and task EROS satellites directly whenever they are within a 2,000-2,400 km radius of the station. SOPs send their fully confidential Imaging Plan to the satellites as they enter a station's communication range and receive images as the plan is executed in real time. SOP use of individual satellites is guaranteed by ISI and may not be pre-empted by other customers or by ISI.5
Prior to 1992, only the United Sates, France, and Japan were persistently in the commercial space imaging market. Russia was also in the market using older film return systems that were not as commercially viable as data linked systems because of delayed image availability.6 Russia's marketing emphasis today remains on mapping and terrain products.
India, Canada, Israel, and South Korea are also marketing imagery today with Australia on the threshold .7
Systems flown today carry a wide variety of sensors and have widely varying capabilities.
The most common sensors are in the various infrared bands, to include multi-band or multispectral (MSI) systems. Panchromatic (PAN), essentially black and white photography, is the next most common, followed by synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging systems. SAR systems differ significantly from other systems in that they are not passive. They illuminate the target with radar energy, and therefore, the images are not literal and they require more specialized interpretation than IR and PAN images. An additional assumption is that as demand for FIGURE 2 higher (and more costly) resolution increases, the number of customers making the demand decreases, potentially making sub 1-meter imagery a specialty item, limited to governments, militaries, and possibly corporate consortiums, and news outlets. An indicator of what the future might like is the lowresolution CSI (remote sensing) markets for weather, cartographic, and hydrological imagery. A steady diet of this imagery is now part of daily life, but it remains a specialized product. It supports markets ranging from the Weather Channel and the local nightly weather forecast, to government support of public cartographic and health requirements to land use planning across the country, yet it is not a consumer item. These markets are well developed and more stable than the much younger 1-meter PAN CSI market. With these observations and assumptions in mind then, it is reasonable that the high-resolution end of the CSI market will be similarly market limited, and not technologically limited. Therefore, it is likely that CSI PAN imagery will, at best, achieve a resolution in the vicinity of one-foot (0.33-meter) by 2010. (Figure 3) .
A trend just as significant as resolution improvement of PAN imagery is the growth into IR, non-visible light imaging and synthetic aperture radar (SAR)1 7 . Examination of this area of CSI reveals too few systems to establish predictive resolution trends, but does reveal gross capabilities for the future. 
SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR (SAR)
Expansion of the space born SAR market may have more impact, although resolutions will lag that of PAN. SAR imagery is the least literal of the extant imaging capabilities but it has the peculiar capability to highlight human features and to penetrate some types of materials such as weather, vegetation, and dry sand. A very notable and public example is the detection of an entire buried, and previously unknown river valley in Libya. 19 The radar was flown on Space Shuttle Endeavour STS-59 as a joint U.S./German/Italian project in 1994.20 Of note is that there are no announced plans to launch a U.S. commercial SAR system. Even with the U.S. absent, the market is likely to expand with the addition of the Russia and Canada. Through 2005, eight future systems have been announced, five of them from the Russia. Canada has announced the best resolution at 3-meters, with other systems announced in the 5-meter range.21
Extrapolation of SAR resolution is not supportable because of the lack of history, but it is possible to predict operational advances in the near future based upon present test-bed systems flown on aircraft. The publicly acknowledged state of the art for aircraft based SAR is 0.3 meters (1 foot). Sandia National Laboratories has published a number of examples of onemeter SAR images and 0.3-meter SAR movies collected from their systems flown on 22 conventional aircraft. These images appear literal, but are not because of the path followed by radar reflections. The time taken for a radar pulse to return to the sensor rather than reflected light, as in the human eye, determines the location of an object on a radar image. Therefore, objects that reflect multiple bounces of the radar beam will appear further away from the sensor than their actual location. Doppler effects produced by moving objects also distort the location of objects. 23 Therefore, specialized interpretation is required. Consequently, it is unlikely that a significant commercial market will emerge. It is likely that commercial uses of SAR will remain specialized. Further discussion assumes a 1-meter, space-based SAR resolution in 2010.
An additional and key component is timeliness. Most companies do not publicly advertise capabilities in terms of time from imaging to customer delivery. U.S. Government licensing, in fact, places timeliness restrictions in the license contract to U.S. companies. For example, the U.S. Government restricts Space Imaging from delivering an image to a customer within 24 hours of image collection. 24 Near real-time will be used as the standard here for image deliver in 2010, however, since the Israeli, ImageSat International advertises this capability today. Traditional military applications-surveillance, observation, target development and planning support, readily come to mind. The addition of a space observation capability gives an opponent ready access to previously denied areas at resolutions approaching that available from a highflying aircraft or terrestrial observation from a distance of a few miles. Looking at PAN imagery only at 0.3-meter resolution, an imagery analyst would be able to identify some types of radio and radar equipment as components of larger systems-air defense radars for example. They could also identify types of supply in a dump, and precisely identify vehicles and small aircraft, to include remotely piloted aircraft. Detailed description of troop formations in the field, airfields, ports, missile sites and ships, is possible, as is technical analysis of larger facilities, such as ports, bridges, rail facilities, and roads.26 In short, anyone with the financial resources can produce detailed order of battle on military units and can monitor unit level activity and operations.
The observables above are in agreement with the U.S. Intelligence Community's National
Image Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS).27 On this scale, 0.3-meters falls in the range of NIIRS 7.28 NIIRS is further broken out by the type of sensor, but for the purposes of this discussion, the differences are not particularly relevant except in instances where a sensor type permits detection or identification of a feature not observable on higher resolution PAN imagery.
Commonly cited examples are disturbed earth on IR, camouflage and dead vegetation on multispectral imagery, and non-metallic decoys on radar imagery.
Publicly available information on NIIRS scales focus almost exclusively on military equipment. However, it is straightforward to transfer to non-military targets with similar size, dispersion, and activity. For example, given the level of detail discernable in ground military activity, it would also be possible to identify characteristic truck activity associated with refueling of a nuclear power plant (or other similar industrial activity) that indicates a window of vulnerability for terrorist attack. In this instance, there is remote observability of a denied area, and the opportunity to produce a dirty bomb without moving nuclear material to the target-it is already there.
Application of other sensor types, even though at the lower resolutions, can also yield significant intelligence. Staying with the nuclear power plant example above, the lack of a heat plume from cooling towers or in cooling water discharge observed with a thermal IR sensor, even at 30m resolution, would indicate an inoperative plant.29 This again is intelligence of potential value to a terrorist group. At the state level, similar application of thermal data on aluminum production plants, for example, may aide a state in price or treaty negotiations for bauxite ore. The potential applications, both beneficial and threatening, are wide ranging.
Going a step further, gross security measures at a wide variety of installations and facilities are observable at 0.3-meter resolution. While space based observation at this resolution would clearly lack sufficient detail to plan an attack on a facility, it would provide detail on physical barriers such as fence lines, berms, approaches, and in some cases, external lighting and guard facilities. Sufficient information to rule out a target or to aide planning for direct observation is available for purchase on the commercial market.
All of this theoretical observability, however, is subject to limitations on the utility of the information that are not immediately obvious. As analysts in most fields know, a single observation of an issue or problem frequently reveals very little. Things like trends, changes, abnormalities, and ultimately meaningful prediction, are absent or not possible with a single look. This is the case whether analyzing stocks, or producing target intelligence for an attack.
Long-term observation is required to build an accurate picture of a target, whether it is from the ground, or from space. Therefore, except in specific cases, intelligence application of CSI remains extremely expensive considering target revisit requirements. The requirement for revisit may explain the high end, high dollar marketing by ImageSat International of turnkey ground station systems with complete imaging control. 30 Therefore, gaining detailed, actionable intelligence from CSI will primarily remain in the province of states and the world's largest multinational corporations. The need to revisit targets, however, does produce an emerging threat in the realm of information operations.
Use of CSI to shape and develop, or even initiate public debate, is emerging as a fact. "...a looming concern for the IC (intelligence community) should be whether or not a representative from a special interest group armed with a limited number of high-resolution satellite images obtained from a commercial venture can initiate significant debate over foreign policy or national security issues and force the IC to respond......sensitive imagery analysis techniques and data derived from other intelligence disciplines ... are at risk if the USG is drawn into public debate with special interest groups that use high-resolution satellite imagery to support agendas that differ from U.S. foreign policy and national security positions." above, would tend to accept that what they are looking at is as claimed. Going beyond error, intent to deceive will to turn poor analysis into an offensive information operations (10) weapon. SCI's use or misuse will tend to accelerate decision cycles and processes, and consequently increase the risk of miss-step or error in decision-making. It is likely that in the near future we will observe a demonstrable instance of CSI forcing a national policy or operational decision or of precipitating a crisis. This event, even if unintended, will signal the beginning of the use of CSI as a tool of information operations. This threshold will be all the more significant if it is the result of a deliberate use of CSI as a debate-shaping instrument.
As the war on terrorism progresses, more opportunities will emerge for policy shaping uses of CSI. For example, it is somewhat surprising that groups opposed to U.S. actions in detaining prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba have not used CSI to press the debate on prisoner of war status for the detainees or to make the case of mistreatment. There are two possible explanations. The first is that the use of imagery would hurt the group's agenda, or second, that this is symptomatic of the previously identified soft market for CSI and a perceived lack of benefit for the cost.
SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A wide variety of responses are available to the United States. The least desirable is to fail to recognize the challenge and to do nothing. The most desirable then is to plan and rehearse in advance. If circumstance drives, and policy bounds the response to a threat, then policy is the variable available to shape possible responses. Response to specific threats or challenges can be one or any combination of law, physical action, and procedural changes.
Proactive policy development requires advance consideration of all of these areas.
LEGAL
For legal restrictions to be effective there must be either an international governing body, or the Untied States must dominate the high-resolution market to such and extent that the it 38 could implement effective controls. Serious movement toward the former does not appear to exist. In the latter case, the expansion in the number of foreign CSI systems, the growing number of countries in the market, and the U.S.'s apparent abandonment of the SAR market all indicate that the opportunity to dominate the market is lost. A market shakeout is likely in the near future. This will eliminate many of the companies presently in or entering the CSI market.
The survivors will likely be those with home government backing, and despite a significantly changed competitive landscape, the U.S. will not emerge as the sole force in the market.
States with the financial means, technical skill, and will to stay in the market will remain.
Russia today is a prototypical example of a state that will stay in the commercial market as a subsidy to its internal intelligence requirements. The same is true of the direction taken by the Unites States. 39 Given a lack of U.S. market domination and the number of emerging international actors in the market, it is unlikely U.S. legal and international treaty restrictions as a counter to CSI derived threats will be effective. 40 Change to legal restrictions, at least in the U.S., is necessary. Prohibited target lists and customer black lists are also justifiable, as is government access to customer and imaging records in accordance with existing laws for other types of corporate records. This is an area also ripe for international treaty and agreement to establish reciprocal procedures for imaging control and access to records. While probably impossible to deny an adversary all remote access (short of destroying an imaging system), there is benefit in making it difficult to circumvent controls.
OFFENSIVE
Offensive action to counter a threat falls squarely into the much larger area of general space access and warfare. In the instance of national emergency and warfare, direct attack on a system, either the space or terrestrial segments, is a viable consideration in the larger context of military operations and space access. 4 1 The probability of reaching this threshold of action is remote and has little or no applicability to the more probably circumstances of use of CSI in support of terrorist activity or as an 10 weapon.
DEFENSIVE
Defensive strategies generally focus on the traditional tactics of denial and deception an on engineering design. The first concern is in protecting military information, particularly movements and dispositions of units. Early in deployments is more critical than later, particularly when there is a command requirement for surprise. Re-implementation of cold war practices of issuing routine satellite over flight warning messages, and implementing local procedures and orders to reduce or eliminate observability during threat windows will provide protection for most small-scale military activity. Protection of large-scale military activity such as the mobilization or deployment of an Army division, or the unscheduled sortie of Naval surface combatants is much more difficult to hide, and therefore requires external support.
A supporting, and often ignored protective tactic is installation and facility design.
Everything from motor pools, deployment staging areas, military aircraft parking and naval berthing should be examined in the design (or retrofit) stage for addition of protective measures to reduce observability. There is a clear cost/benefit conflict, but retrofit of features to facilities to deny observability of areas exhibiting high potential for exposing damaging military information is necessary. Military construction programs should include a threat assessment and anti-satellite observability as a design criterion.
The same recommendations apply to industrial design. Returning to the nuclear power Use of CSI to press an agenda or force policy decisions may have already occurred.
Further challenges are likely in the future. The characteristics of a challenge to policy are likely to cause the government to lose the initiative temporarily. Regulation as a tool to control this challenge is not possible given the international nature of the market. Excessive U.S. regulation would simply drive the market offshore. What remains is acceptance of this new environment and a need to develop new and agile policy, and operating methods.
The key to improving the agility of a government response to a policy challenge is advance planning. It is not enough for imagery analysts, or even senior military leadership to recognize the problem: recognition and planning must be interagency. Analysis and exercise of policy options in advance of these types of challenges will improve agility in dealing with them.
Having general guidelines in place for dealing with CSI driven policy challenges will significantly shorten the government's response time and correspondingly improve the credibility of the response. There are a number of potential policy options, to include silence, release of intelligence data, and establishment of Intelligence Community (IC) partnerships with nongovernmental organizations. 42 Other earlier proposed options are promotion of the free flow of information, negotiated restraints, and direct countermeasures (combination of offensive and defensive). 43 Silence simply capitalizes on the existing shortfalls, further damaging credibility. Release of intelligence data will usually be a poor option because repeated compromise of sources and methods will rapidly erode the IC's capabilities and relevance. In particularly serous examples, however, this may be a legitimate and feasible option. U.S. display in the United Nations of imagery of Russian missile sites in Cuba is a good historical example." Development of general guidelines for release of intelligence, with streamlined and practiced procedures is essential. Established partnerships and trusted relationships will speed the development of responses when public disclosure of intelligence to refute challenge is not justified.
Exercise and testing of proposed responses will build confidence and further improve government agility. Just as the military at all levels practices interaction with the press, so
should there be practice in dealing with technological and 10 based challenges to operations and policy. Incorporation of CSI derived challenges into existing exercises, particularly in the Department of Defense should be a priority under the greater umbrella of exercising 10.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of high-resolution commercial space imaging systems presents a wide variety of threats and challenges. The ability of anyone or any group with the financial assets to obtain space imagery capable of discerning objects down to one foot in size and to detect a wide variety of other activity using radar and multi-spectral imaging represents a significant military and political capability. The most threatening, least recognized, and most likely of these is the use of imagery as a component of information operations directed at policy formulation and execution. By re-instituting old protective procedures and practices, and by integrating consideration of space observability into operational planning and facility design we can reduce the threats posed by direct observability. Responding to this change in the operational landscape requires action now. The most important is recognition of the trends in space imaging capabilities, the use of the products, and of the impact on operations and policy execution. We can adapt to and mitigate the changed environment once we have recognized these changes. The most critical task is to develop action plans for policy challenges that will facilitate government agility in dealing with a challenge based upon conclusions drawn from CSI. By 2010 it will be necessary for us operate with the realization that what we do is observable, and that what is observed may either be interpreted incorrectly, or may be deliberately misrepresented.
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ENDNOTES
1 Imaging resolution is a linear measure (distance). The given value is the minimum distance or separation required between objects to resolve them as two distinct objects in the image. In the vernacular, it is frequently the smallest sized object discernable on an image. The distinction may seem trivial, but can be significant. For example, given an image of 1-meter resolution, a row of concrete traffic barriers that are 3 meters in length would appear as a continuous object if they had a 1-foot/0.3-meter gap between the barriers. At a 1-foot or less resolution they would appear to be distinct objects of 3m length. Ground sampling distance (GSD) is also used as a measure of resolution and in electro-optical systems may be expressed as different values in each axis. The difference between GSD and resolution are trivial for the purposes of this paper. 
